Coal Age

AUG 2012

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1940-1949 erty were not at fault. In the coal case, the defiant parties—the officials of the United Mine Workers—were actually rewarded for that defiance by being granted much of what they demanded…" One of the major issues of contract contention throughout World War II was portal to portal pay. Operators objected to the notion that travel time— commuting from the washhouse to the face, was time they needed to compensate. In the end, the labor friendly government sided against them. The controversial series of walkouts and seizures, and the public's divided reaction would prove a tipping point in the power of John L. Lewis, the UMWA and American industrial unions. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 limiting union powers would be a direct result of the contentious war-time strike. However, in the short run, with gov- ernment either running the mines or keep- ing the labor peace, output increased to astronomical levels. The 684,455,000 tons produced in 1944 was the greatest volume of coal ever raised in the United States. In early 1945, Lewis again threatened further work stoppages. In this round of negotiations, his opening gambit began with the boast that the UMWA would seek a $0.10 royalty on each ton mined to be placed into a union run welfare fund. They also declared the right to strike at will. "Even the resound- ing words in which they are cloaked fail to conceal the real purposes of these demands—a war chest for organizing backed up by ability to shut off fuel and raw material at any time," wrote an enraged Given in the March 1945 editorial. "Contract by fiat is already an accomplished fact in coal mining and has given the industry no reason to anticipate that government offi- cials making such contracts know or care what happens to the industry as a result." That issue the magazine published a long article analyzing what they felt Lewis really was after: the creation of a massive slush fund to help foster a totally unionized econ- omy that could, at will, cut off the raw mate- rials needed for existence. Or worse, that the 10-cent per ton tax could fund something of a Bolshevik revolution with Lewis at the head of the vanguard. Safety During the War Years Though remembered for other reasons, 1941 also marked the enactment of the federal mine inspection law, effective May 7, result- ing in direct national government participa- tion in accident-prevention work. The December issue contained in a "Special Safety Section" about what "that field is and how the United States Bureau of Mines is organizing to carry out its increased respon- sibilities and functions under the act. The section even included a "safety quiz" for fel- low employees. Reducing absenteeism in the mine. *Coal Age, January 1944 82 www.coalage.com Though the Bureau had been making mine inspections for more than 30 years, "heretofore such inspections have been made intermittently and on a purely voluntary basis in so far as the mine management was con- cerned. Under the new law, a periodic basis is set up and the inspections carry a clear and specific legal authorization." Penalties for denying inspection included fines up to $500, imprisonment for up to 60 days or both. Not coincidentally, that year would mark an all- time best safety record for producers. The 1941 death rate per million tons of coal produced reached the lowest point yet recorded. Best, bituminous miners achieved their historic low fatality rate yet while 100th Anniversary Special Issue Cards such as this were awarded to safety key men to hang in their offices or working sections. *Coal Age, April 1940 increasing tonnage by more than 45 million tons. Though over 1,200 coal miners lost their lives, safety had improved. That trend, however, would be reversed the following year. In the September 1942 issue, the editors reported the accident rate was increasing. "That fact should be a dan- ger signal not to be overlooked even in the present hurly-burly of getting out the coal, as injuries and fatalities are directly reflected in lower efficiency and increased cost, not to mention loss of much-needed manpower for the war effort." With many experienced miners fighting overseas and many newer, younger and older workers taking their places, accident rates increased throughout the year. Given lamented that "The evidence points strongly" that "war and its attendant dislocation of normal operation" was result- ing "in the sacrifice of safety gains." By the end of the year, loss of life rose 17% against a 12.5% gain in output. Total number of fatali- ties for 1942 was 1,482, more than 200 more deaths than the year before. Increasing casu- alty rates in the mines that year and carrying over into the next partially led to the contro- versial strikes of 1943. This decrease in safety happened in the second full year of the Bureau of Mines' new position as federal safety inspector. During 1942 agents visited 886 mines in 20 states employing approximately 258,000 men and producing more than 280 million tons. Roughly 40%-45% of producing mines were inspected. Fatality rates were virtually unchanged the following year, as another 1,471 men were killed as production increased slightly. Death rates were high again in 1944, but by the time the war ended in August of 1945, accident rates were falling August 2012

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