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One of those likely most anticipated was the results from a review of a May 12 coal rock outburst in West Virginia, the year's only double fatality (which occurred at a mine targeted for its pat- tern of violations). Continuous miner operator Eric Legg and roof bolter/MRS oper- ator Gary Hensley were both killed while pulling pillars and extract- ing coal at the Patriot Coal's Brody No. 1 mine in Boone County. They were the fourth and fifth coal deaths of the year. In its preliminary report, MSHA indicated the incident occurred at the No. 5 entry of the 4 East Mains panel. The room-and-pillar oper- ation was of an average size, employing 193 with 171 underground. In its fatalgram alert on the incident, the agency went on to say that crews were mining the second lift of the left pillar block at the time of the rib burst, and stressed the frequent and thorough exami- nations of mine roofs, faces and ribs in the wake of the incident. MSHA inspectors also highlighted the importance of following roof control plans and training all miners on the specifics of proper com- pliance to RCPs. While retreat mining was not mentioned specifically in the agen- cy's best practices, officials did allude to mines' need to ensure suitable pillar dimensions and mining method for a given area, and that roof and rib control is adequate for the depth of cover where work is being performed. MSHA also noted that a geological fea- ture map should be developed, including unusual conditions, to determine the best mining plan to address potentially adverse roof and rib conditions. In the final report released October 7, the agency did not indicate any discrepancies in training records for either worker, but did go into a lengthy discussion about a prior event on May 9 that was not reported to the mine's district office — with similar circumstances without the more serious result. The operator was cited as a result, and MSHA did not close its books on the fatal incident without directly tying it in to its conclusion. "The accident occurred because the mine operator failed to recog- nize areas with potential rib burst conditions, and to develop and implement a method of mining suitable to mine safely and control those conditions," it reported. "Mine management took insufficient actions to investigate the previous rib burst accident that occurred on the No. 1 Section on May 9, 2014, and failed to address hazardous conditions that caused the rib burst. Management's failure to recognize and address the hazards associated with rib burst conditions, resulted in continued exposure to the hazard and led to the deaths of two miners on May 12." Closing out MSHA's report was its root cause analysis, which con- firmed that the operator subsequently abandoned the 4 East Mains section and discontinued retreat mining activities at the mine and discontinued all mining in the eastern side of the mine where the fatal accident occurred. It cited Brody three separate times; the first was for a violation of 30 CFR, § 75.202(a), for rib support, again tied in to the unreported event. "The operator failed to recognize a precursor burst, which occurred on the No. 1 Section on May 9, 2014, and also failed to take adequate corrective actions to protect the miners from hazardous rib conditions," it said. "The operator failed to develop and implement a plan, or method, of mining designed to eliminate the hazardous conditions associat- ed with a coal burst, and at approximately 8:15 p.m. on Monday, May 12, 2014, a second violent burst occurred on the No. 1 Section fatally injuring two miners." A written notice of pattern of violations notice had previously been issued to the operator in October 2013, and officials also noted that the mine violated Standard 75.202(a) and was consequently cited 15 times in two years for the infraction. It also was given a citation for a violation of 30 CFR, § 50.10(d), for not reporting the first incident. "The operator failed to immediately report an accident…May 9, 2014," MSHA said. "This accident involved a coal rib outburst that covered the con- tinuous mining machine operator with coal/rock debris from below his thigh, temporarily entrapping him and requiring assistance to free him from the rubble. Due to this accident, miners and equip- ment were required to be withdrawn from the active mining area in the Nos. 6, 7 and 8 entries. "By not reporting this accident, the mine operator deprived MSHA the opportunity to investigate the accident and also failed to deter- mine the root cause of the accident." Finally, a citation was issued for a violation of 30 CFR, § 50.12, as the mine did not properly preserve the accident site from the first of the two events. "The operator allowed the destruction of evidence that would have contributed to the investigation of the accident," the report noted. "The failure to preserve this accident site prevented MSHA from performing an accident investigation into the cause or causes of the accident. The investigation would have prohibited mining activity in the affected area until MSHA permitted the operator to resume nor- mal mining activities." s a f e t y r e p o r t c o n t i n u e d February 2015 www.coalage.com 49 The last 2014 fatal incident occurred at Highland Mining's Highland 9 operation in Kentucky and took the life of Eli Eldridge, who was struck by a battery ram car. MSHA released its final observations and conclusions in October from a May 2014 double fatality at Patriot Coal's Brody No. 1 mine in West Virginia. It killed CM operator Eric Legg and roof bolter/MRS operator Gary Hensley.