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were mostly during contract renewal negoti- ations in an era of perceived worldwide energy shortages. In the 1974 agreement iners received a 54% wage and benefit increase over three years. A cost-of-living clause, the first in the union's history, was also included. Vacation days rose from 20 to 30 days a year, and five days of "personal leave" were also established. This was the start of rich pensions and retiree medical benefits that eventually hurt all companies with UMWA-organized mines (This was one of the reasons why Patriot went through Chapter 11.) Job security was the main issue during the 1978-1979 strike. The epidemic of wildcat strikes that occurred during 1981 and 1982 severely affected union membership and revenues as miners felt the union's collective bargaining power and clout at the work site had not been restored. In 1984, Massey refused to sign the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) agreement, which historically set the standard for wages and benefits throughout the industry. This action caused major production setbacks not only at Massey mines, but at all UMWA- organized mines east of the Mississippi River. In 1993, the UMWA called a prolonged strike to protest the opening of non-union mines. It had hoped to regain members and influence. Considered an unsuccessful strike against the BCOA, it further weak- ened the image of the UMWA. ILB Labor Issues: UMWA vs. Non-union Production During the 1970s, UMWA production accounted for approximately 95% of total ILB production, but has since dropped as non-union production flourished. Non- union production received its first boost in the late 1970s when the big eight producers (Peabody, Arch, CONSOL, AMAX, Freeman United, Island Creek, Pittsburg & Midway and Old Ben) received long-term contracts to supply new coal-fired power plants with a guaranteed coal supply. To comply, most of these companies dropped their small accounts (mainly small utilities and indus- trial coal consumers). This in turn allowed the non-union companies to open mines to supply the void left by the big companies. Undependable production, low produc- tivity and the high costs associated with UMWA mines are the primary reasons UMWA production has dropped over the years. For instance, production statistics filed with the Illinois Coal Association revealed that in the 12 months ending March 31, 1979, a total of 573 eight-hour production shifts were idled at Illinois mines because of wildcat walkouts. This resulted in the loss of an estimated 1.3 mil- lion tons of production, but was not con- sidered a strike. In another instance, after Freeman United opened its Crown III mine in 1981, the union shut it down in 1982 for three years. In 1987, they closed it again. After the union agreed to concessions, the company reopened Crown III in 1991. The strikes between 1970 and 1994 great- ly impacted supply, which caused con- sumers to search for alternative options (Western coals). During each extended walkout, some Midwestern utilities were kept supplied from non-union mines in the ILB and western U.S. — a lesson not lost on some coal consumers for whom depend- ability of supply was critical. These events created substantial changes in the minds of coal producers as well. They also created a new mindset among the hourly workers, who could see the damage to paychecks caused by extended union disruptions. The AMAX Experience I have first-hand experience with UMWA antics, having witnessed, after the 1981 strike, Lowry Blackburn, then-president of AMAX Coal Co., stating in an internal meet- ing that AMAX would not build any new mines in the ILB, and that the company would only serve the existing long-term contracts and subsequently exit the ILB. Some of the disruptive incidents I saw were the numerous walkouts at the Delta mine in southern Illinois. One especially comes to mind. It was a hot 100°F day in July 1990. There was no drinking water in the pit so one of the non-union foreman (a mining engineer) picked up a large water jug, drove it to the pit and dropped it off. The union members were outraged. "That's a union job!" they cried. So they walked off the job for three days. Since the mine was not making money, AMAX (Cyprus Amax at the time) was bought out of its contract with CIPS's Newton power plant for approximately $70 million. The mine was permanently closed in 1996. The plant switched to Western coal. I also have a Wabash mine experience. The Wabash mine was a 3.5-4 million tons per year (tpy) continuous mining operation in southeastern Illinois. All (100%) of its production was sold under an above-mar- o r g a n i z e d l a b o r c o n t i n u e d February 2015 www.coalage.com 51 Figure 2: ILB UMWA – Non-Union Production, 1970-2014, 2015 Projected