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mine in 2012 and the closure of Patriot's Highland No. 9 mine in 2014, production from UMWA-organized mines will cease to exist in 2015. UMWA vs. Non-union ILB Underground With the exception of one year (see Figure 4), overall, UMWA miner productivity lagged non-union miner productivity for the entire period. (It should be noted that UMWA sur- face mine productivity also lagged non- union productivity.) It was only in 1997 that overall ILB UMWA productivity was higher than non-union productivity. This was mainly due to the Wabash mine dropping its production capacity by 2 million tpy as result of its contract to supply the PSI Gibson power plant being bought out by Black Beauty — a non-union operator. With a modified UMWA contract, Wabash mine productivity improved from 3 to 3.5 tpmh in 1997. With the least pro- ductive UMWA mine (Wabash) reducing production, it allowed overall UMWA min- er productivity to increase in that particu- lar year. But it was also a year where most other UMWA mines improved productivi- ty due to strong demand and perhaps the UMWA miners thought their mines would also reduce production or shut down, so they worked harder. Unfortunately, the higher productivity was short lived. After 1997, UMWA productivity lagged non- union productivity each year thereafter. Starting in 2010-2011, non-union under- ground productivity increased dramatically as result of Foresight Energy opening its longwall mines. At the same time, UMWA productivity dropped substantially, effec- tively sealing the fate of the other mines in the region (Crown III and Highland No. 9). Highland No. 9 Mine — A Brief History Formerly known as Peabody Coal Co.'s Camp mine complex and located in Union and Henderson counties of the western Kentucky coalfields, the UMWA-organized Patriot Highland No. 9 mine re-opened in the first quarter of 2003. During the first 10 years of production, the continuous miner operation success- fully produced at a rate of approximately 900,000 tons, occasionally producing more than 1 million tons. Peak production occurred in 2008 when 3.9 million tons of clean coal were produced. Miner produc- tivity was also relatively strong when com- pared to other continuous mining operations in the ILB, averaging 4.6 tpmh. The industry average was 4.7 tpmh. However, something happened shortly after Patriot and Highland were spun from Peabody in October 2007. Starting in 2008 and continuing into 2012, the mine's pro- ductivity started to wane. In the first quarter of 2012, miner produc- tivity was a relatively healthy 4.1 tpmh when nearly 1 million tons were produced, but a big change was about to occur. By the third quarter of 2013, miner productivity dropped to a dismal 2.8 tpmh and produc- tion dropped to 610,000 tons. It is apparent the lower productivity corresponds with Patriot's July 7, 2012, Chapter 11 bankrupt- cy filing. Reportedly, absenteeism soared as Highland workers became worried about their vacation time and sick leave, and therefore took time off. Morale waned throughout 2013 as UMWA leadership implemented a public relations campaign against the potential changes to pay and benefits resulting from the bankruptcy. Turnover was high, as many workers apparently fled to work at Alliance's new River View mine, which was hiring at the time. Patriot held job fairs in east and west Kentucky during the fall of 2013 to help fill open positions at Highland. By the end of 2013, the combination of high absenteeism and loss of experienced labor and management caused productivity to decline by approximately 33%. Patriot emerged from bankruptcy on December 18, 2013. However, the combi- nation in 2014 of low and stagnant pro- ductivity and falling market prices sealed the fate of the mine. It is common knowl- edge that the Highland complex was tar- geted to produce 4 million tpy, and was likely competitive at this volume. At a rate of 3 million tpy, the costs skyrocketed above management's expectations and the market value of the coal. It is reported that production increased to targeted vol- umes after the 60-day notice was commu- nicated on December 5, but by then, it was too late. With the mine's closure, approxi- mately 480 employees permanently lost their jobs. Looking forward, it is highly unlikely the UMWA will ever be able to recover from the mess they created. In 2013, the editors of Encyclopedia Britannica wrote this: "The UMWA's efforts through the first half of the 20 th century made American miners among the best-paid and best-insured miners in the world. Its influence has weakened as a result of the combined consequences of automation, the development of alterna- tive sources of fuel, and a general decline in the American labor movement." It is this author's opinion that the greedi- ness and sluggishness of the UMWA work- force, coupled with difficult work rules in the UMWA contracts that led to lower pro- ductivity and higher costs and the influ- ence UMWA radicals at the mine level, were the real underlying cause of its demise. Finally, I send my sincere condolences to the family of Eli Eldridge — the last UMWA miner to lose his life in the ILB. He died in a haulage accident on December 16, 2014, just days before the Highland No. 9 mine's permanent closure. John T. Hanou is president of Hanou Energy Consulting LLC, a consulting firm that assists coal producers, transportation companies, steel companies, power generators and investors in solving issues related to coal mar- kets. He can be reached at (410) 279-3818 or by email at jthanou@hanouenergy.com. o r g a n i z e d l a b o r c o n t i n u e d February 2015 www.coalage.com 53 Figure 5: Highland No. 9 Mine Quarterly Production, 2013-2014