Coal Age

AUG 2012

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1940-1949 Steelman, on leave of absence from his post as director of the U.S. Conciliation Service and acting as chairman of the committee voted in favor of the agreement. Dissenting was Benjamin F. Fairless, president of the United States Steel Corp. However, once war broke out the gov- ernment began demanding even more of the coal industry: its men. Thousands of replacement workers were needed as absen- teeism and enrollment in the military were taking a toll. Though the selective service would eventually become more selective during the war and draft less miners, man- power was a constant challenge. To help, as reported in the October 1942 edition, the UMWA agreed at its convention to a longer working schedule and a six-day work week. But in the same issue, Given wondered, with new wage contracts coming up in 1943, how well operators were pre- pared to enter the negotiation period? Regardless of operators' positions, without a contract, the UMWA was ready to do battle of its own. In the February 1943 issue, the magazine reported on a wildcat walk-out by some 17,000 anthracite workers in January. The nation's worst labor stoppage since Pearl Harbor, after several days of demonstra- tions, the miners were ordered back to work by President Roosevelt who cited the lost production and its effect on the war effort. Though the labor action was confined to Pennsylvania, it was but the opening skir- mish in a longer struggle. Work weeks grew to 48-hours that spring for most miners and the UMWA announced it was beginning to organize supervisors and mine officials into the new Mine Officials Union of America. Still without a nationwide contract, a larger, nationwide "stoppage" was announced in May and, after a short reprieve, a second one in June due to a breakdown of contract negotiations. Lewis ordered his men back to work after a few days under another threat from Roosevelt. Though most workers returned on June 7, the government began initiating a series of mine seizures, taking over the day-to-day operations from private industry. Lewis had forced the administration into a difficult position. Though by this time Roosevelt was beginning to seethe with antipathy toward Lewis, he needed labor's vote and support— and most of his administration did indeed side with them. But if the miners struck, dozens of other crafts might as well, courting disaster for the war effort. Citing national emergency, Roosevelt ordered powerful Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to begin taking over mines that spring. "The coal-mine seizure reflects far more than an attempt to cope with the grave pro- duction problem precipitated by a defiant labor leader. Rather, when the administra- tion chose this way out, it confessed its com- plete failure to capitalize on an unparalleled opportunity for developing a workable labor-relations policy that would safeguard not only the rights of employer and employ- ee but also the rights of the government and the nation as a whole," wrote Given. Unlike during World War I when miners strikes were met with troops who forced workers back into the mines at bayonet point, seizure forced mine owners to accept most union conditions. Mine operators were further threatened with outright national- ization of their assets if work stoppages con- 80 www.coalage.com 100th Anniversary Special Issue August 2012

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